fulness, Elphinstone's bodily and mental decay, Shelton's stupid wilfulness, chronic dissensions between the civil and military powers, Sale's withholding of timely succour, all conspired, with Lord Auckland's half-measures and ill-timed economies, to work out the dramatic Nemesis of an enterprise begun in fully and wrong-doing. A Nott, or even a Keane, would have turned to worthier account the zeal of his officers and the disciplined courage of his troops. A better managed retreat would have saved our honour and many thousand lives. Viewed however in connexion with the events of the past three years, the annihilation of Elphinstone's force looked like our just reward for the wanton invasion of Afghánistán. It seemed as though a curse had brooded over our Afghán policy from the day when British troops escorted Sháh Shujá towards his former capital; a curse which blinded Macnaghten's eyes to the plainest facts; which led Burnes and Cotton to choose the worst possible site for cantonments; which placed a gentlemanly invalid in the chief command, and stultified the efforts of our ablest and smtu-test officers to atone for the shortcomings of their imbecile chiefs.
