explained. The companies originally acquired, in many cases, and sometimes com pulsorily, more land than was necessary for the accommodation of the then prospective traffic.,ubsequently, under less far-seeing administration, the companies divested themselves of much of this apparently surplus land with the result that within the past few years they have found their traffic developing at a rapid rate, while their lines are hedged in by barriers of highly valued lands, urgently needed for extensions, but only to be repurchased at high prices. In other cases they bought only so much as was necessary for immediate use and now find themselves in a similar sitnation. Thus the extension of station accommodation and the doubling and quadrupling of lines are prevented or postponed. The existence of this state of matters is due, then, partly to want of 'foresight of past railway administrators, and partly to the relatively high value of land in Scotland.
On those lines which are single instead of being double, and which instead of being quadruple are only double, and at stations where the siding accommodation is insuW. cient, the great waste of time of men and of plant takes place. Ioaded goods and mineral trains stand with their locomotives for hours waiting for opportunities to shunt, while trains and men stand waiting for hours for locomotives. All this involves great increase in working expenses and immense iTitation among the nen who have to spend so much time in an absolutely futile fashion.
The question, so far as the companies' exchequers are concerned, is really one in administrative finance. Given a traffic growing at an uncertain rate of increase, which method involves lesser charge upon annual revenue, (1) the expenditure of capital in duplication of lines and in increase of plant involving a corresponding increase in staff, or (2) the existing method of working, involving congestion of traffic, large claims for delay, discontent of staff, with risks of periodical strikes. It may be worth the railway companies' while to continue to employ the present,. method, but the presnmption is against it. The English railways th larger proportional working expenses than the Scottish, pay larger dividends.
Summary.—The plain statement of the case is, then, that tle men were overworked or thought they were, that they left the service, or remained discontented, and that the places of those who did leave were filled by others who had by disposition or custom less inclination to a.dopt the dignified method customary in the higher grades of labou�, xqz., withdrawal from irksome employment. Railxx, ay employment became less desirable, and less desirable men undertook it. This was the reason for the occurrence of the strike, and for its occurrence without notice.
If the theory of the strike advanced above is a sound one, it is quite clear that in the nature of things, the administrators of the,Scottish railvays must take a rather larger view of thei� /unctions than they have hitherto done. If administrative skill adequate to deal with rapidly growing organizations is not forthcoming, retribution, which has overtaken the cmnpanies once, must overtake them again.
THE EFFECTS OF THE STRIKE AND THE LOSSES DUE TO IT.
1. As regards the Piblic.—The loss and inconvenience to the public are incalculable. The leading ites are: —-(a) Loss due to enforced
1 The working expenses of tle English lines were, in 1889. 52 per ceut., and of the Scottish lines 49 per cent, {See Railway Returns, c, 6118.) The net ceipt.4 were respectively 4'3 per cent. and 3'6 per cent. on the .tot.l c. apital,
