many ironmasters are lessees of mines. When the iron trade is depressed, the coal which in good times is used for the manufacture of iron is thrown on the market and prices rapidly fall; but as soon as the ironmaster feels the influence of high prices the coal is taken off the market and prices rapidly rise.
From the point of view of wages, workers in and about mines fall into two classes: (1) those paid by the piece, and (2) those paid by the day. The hewer is the type of the former class. As a rule he is paid by the number of tons be sends to the surface. Other underground men and surface men are paid by the day, mainly because the product of their labour is not capable of actual measurement. But it may be laid down as a general principle, at least in mines, that day wages follow piece wages. A rise in the wages of hewers is usually accompanied by a rise in the wages of day workers. For instance, the sliding scales formerly in use in Durham provided for a rise and fall in the wages of enginemen, mechanics, and banksmen, as well as the wages of hewers. We may therefore take the wages of hewers as typical of wages in coal mining. Under the sliding scale system the tonnage rate of wages rises and falls with prices. But even where no scale is in operation wages follow prices. It is true that sometimes attempts are made to increase wages and to increase prices, but the force of competition prevents any artificial price being maintained. Only a monopolist can control prices, and even he is limited by the views of the consumer. During the years of the coal famine wages rose as prices increased, and fell as prices decreased.
The individual miner has but little control over prices. He may diminish or increase his own output, but he can obtain no guarantee that new pits will not be opened or that diminished production will not affect foreign markets. Concerted action on the part of the majority of miners would undoubtedly affect the production and the price of coal, but any large rise in prices at once sets in motion forces that tend to bring about a fall.
If, as I have argued, a reduction in the hours of labour will not eventually affect the output, it follows that it will not raise the price of coal. The miner cannot therefore expect any increase in his tonnage rate. Before the tonnage rate rises prices must rise; the production remaining the same prices remain as they were before.
Nor can the miner have any guarantee that prices will be
