competition, and the rise in price to the manufacturer. All these points depend on the output. If the total output be maintained there will be no rise in price, and no disadvantage as regards the foreigner; if the output per miner be maintained there will be no increase in the cost of production. As regards wages, if the total output and the output per miner be maintained, wages will not be affected by the reduction in hours. An attempt was made by the mine-owners to show that 'inland coalfields compete at a disadvantage with those on the seaboard. You will only slightly increase the disadvantage and shut out the inland coal-fields to a large extent from the markets on which they depend.' But this argument is at variance with the statements put forward by lessees before the Royal Commission on Mining Royalties. Mr. Alfred Barnes, M.P., and other lessees pointed out that the geographical position of a mine was always taken into account in iixing royalties. Any disadvantage attaching to inland coal-fields falls on the royalty owner and not on the lessee who works the mine. Space, however, will not permit the further discussion of this argument.
In conclusion, it may be pointed out that the miners themselves have the greatest possible interest in maintaining their individual output. Any rise in prices leads, as we have seen, to the development of new coal-fields, and if the miners by restricting production raise prices and increase the number of those employed, the depression that ensues when bad times arrive is intensified. One of the main causes of the low wages subsequent to 1876 was the impetus given to the coal industry in 1872 and 1873. Hence self-interest would impel the miner to endeavour to maintain production.
J. E. C. Munro
