394 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL financial in the Argentine Republic were, not only not visibly improving, but at times threatened to relapse into still greater confusion than had been witnessed. By waiting the Bank of England might perhaps benefit considerably the Baring estate; but by waiting the shareholders of the London joint-stock banks might on the other hand have to forego a dividend. It will appear, no doubt, to some people ungrateful and uncharitable to endearour to weaken the position which the prompt and energetic action of the Bank of England has placed them m in the public estimation. It can very easily happen that in such grave and ex- citing circumstances as those in which they found themselves when that momentous decision had to be taken, the judgment might be somewhat unhinged, and besides it could not perhaps have been foreseen that the Bank would have to come under such heavy advances. But in treating matters of this sort, sentiment ought not to be allowed to stand in the way of an outspoken opinion on the course pursued because susceptibilities may be ruffled. The duty of those who are in a better position than the generality of observers to form a judgment in such matters, is to force the discussion of a principle such as that in question, even at the risk of that judgment being afterwards pronounced to be wrong. The question I have raised is: Should the Bank of England under similar, or nearly similar circumstances, take such a responsibility upon itself again ? So far all has gone fairly well; but no one could foresee that, and such being the case, I think the conclusion must be arrived at, that the first Bank in the empire should not, to prevent the fall of one firm, no matter how big, place itself !n such a position that, in the event of similar dis.asters following, ?t would have to confess itself unable to afford any assmtance. ARTHUR CRUMP THE X?ORTUGUESE CRISIS IT is always impossible to dissociate politics from national finance. In the case of Portugal finance is not a section of politics; it is the chief part, and almost the whole. Accordingly, political trouble has ensued upon trouble in Portuguese finance. A Ministry has been overthrown; revolution is still looked for as the possible offspring of social discontent. The country, deprived of the help of the financiers, and short of the usual inflow of foreign capital, is distressed. Finance, and nothing else, is at the root of the whole crisis;finance, and nothing else, needs to be considered. For many years past Portugal has been accumulating fresh debt, while making no attempt to pay off old. The amount of Portuguese 3 per cents. was, in 1872, 66 millions sterling; the amount is now consider- ably over 100 millions, and bonds of other denominations exist. How, then, has this increase been brought about ? The answer is: by cor- ruption among the official classes; by the aid of eager financiers, who undertook to find the ever-growing floating-debt from time to time, and made large profits on the transactions: by the feebleness of the Portu- guese Government, which was throughout too ready to borrow afresh rather than impose taxes for the purpose of meeting national liabilities; - !
