436 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL ultimatum unflinchingly, and it was especially his merit to apply it resolutely to the reform of law and government. But, as Mr. Montague well says, ' the principle of utility is valuable not as a creative but as a critical principle. It is valuable as a test, not as a germ. Its true potency is negative. a potency to lay bare injustice, to nnravel sophistry, to cancel verbiage. For such purposes it is most efficacious. Is a law really and not merely apparently partial ? Is it a principle for aggrandizing a class of citizens without any reference to the common weal ? If so, it will not bear to be tried by a standard which requires the legislator to seek the happiness of the greatest number and of each individual equally with every other individual. Is a law incapable of being explained or justified except by merely technical arguments, by professional petitio princi?ii or professional pedantry ? If so, it will not bear to be tried by a standard which makes happiness the object of all legislation. Is a law upheld merely by force of habit or tradition, irrespective of the needs of the present time ? If so, neither will it bear the application of the test of utility. This test of utility sweeps away much injustice and much absur?lity, simply because it is a test which involves a recognition of the rights of every citizen and the recognition of a solid practical aim in legislation.' But, as Mr. Montague goes on to point out, the principle of utility will not serve us so well when we pass from criticism to definite reconstruction. ' However fully convinced that he ought to aim at the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the legislator cannot advance a step without knowing wherein consists their happiness, and this knowledge he cannot obtain without a mature study of human nature generally, and of the character of his own people in particular.' He certainly cannot obtain it by a mere summa- tion of pleasures. For the working out of this and many other interesting points the reader must be referred to Mr. Montague's Introduction. This introduction is admirably done throughout. The account of Bentham's life and characteristics is short, but clear and interesting. We miss, indeed, the winged words in which Mill summed up the qualities of his master, and we miss also a nnmber of details by which vividness might have been given to the description; but doubtless the limitations of the present undertaking prevented the introduction of many minute illustrations. The sketch of the history of legislative theories is careful and suggestive. The only serious omission is an account of the work of Blackstone, of which the Fraqm?t is a criticism. It i? true, as Mr. Montague puts it, that 'we still read the Fra?jm?t o? Crovernm?nt in order to see, not how far Blackstone was wrong, but how far Bentham was right;.' Still, even this a?m can scarcely be satisfactorily attained without a clear understanding of the nature of the doctrine against which his criticisms were directed. The concluding section of Mr. Montague's introduction, however, in which he discusses Bentham's own doctrines, as indicated in the Fra?jm?nt, is undoubtedly the most important part of his work. His examination is full and searching. He regards the ?'ragm?tt as being
