mankind.” U.S. analysts prefer “community of common destiny for mankind,” (emphasis added) because it more faithfully reflects the CCP’s China-centrism. On “community of common destiny for mankind,” see Liza Tobin, “Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge for Washington and its Allies,” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (November 2018), p. 155, https://tnsr.org/2018/11/xis-vision-for-transforming-global-governance-a-strategic-challenge-for-washington-and-its-allies/; and Daniel J. Tobin, prepared testimony for hearing on “A ‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards,” p. 9. See also Xi Jinping, On Building a Human Community with a Shared Future (Beijing, China: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 2019).
170 Liza Tobin, “Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge for Washington and its Allies,” p. 155.
171 Nadège Rolland, prepared testimony for hearing on “A ‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 13, 2020, pp. 4-6, https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/china-model-beijings-promotion-alternative-global-norms-and-standards.
172 Xi Jinping, “Improve Our Ability to Participate in Global Governance,” main points of the speech at the 35th group study session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, September 27, 2016, in Xi, The Governance of China II, pp. 489-490.
173 “Xi Urges Breaking New Ground in Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” Xinhua News, June 24, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/24/c_137276269.htm; and Daniel J. Tobin, prepared testimony for hearing on “A ‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards.”
174 Matthew Kroenig, The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy vs. Autocracy from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 11-49.
175 Katsuji Nakazawa, “China’s Street-Stall Debate Puts Xi and Li at Odds,” Nikkei Asian Review, June 11, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/China-s-street-stall-debate-puts-Xi-and-Li-at-odds.
176 Christopher Gobel and Lynette H. Ong, “Social Unrest in China,” Europe China Research and Advice Network, October 1, 2012, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/186507; Huileng Tan, “China’s Says Its Economy Grew 6.1% in 2019, in Line with Expectations,” CNBC, January 16, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/17/china-gdp-for-full-year-and-q4-2019.html; and “GDP growth (annual %) — China,” World Bank, accessed August 28, 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN.
177 Sidney Leng, “Coronavirus: China Faces Historic Test as Pandemic Stokes Fear of Looming Unemployment Crisis,” South China Morning Post, May 11, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3083513/coronavirus-china-faces-historic-test-pandemic-stokes-fears. See also “China Plans Tighter Control to Counter Social Unrest Over Virus,” Bloomberg News, April 22, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-22/china-plans-tighter-control-to-counter-social-unrest-over-virus.
178 Kaj Malden and Suzanna Stephens, “Cascading Economic Impacts of the COVID-19 Outbreak in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 21, 2020, https://uscc.gov/research/cascading-economic-impacts-covid-19-outbreak-china.
179 China imports more than 95 percent of high-end chips used in computers and servers “despite spending billions to catch up.” See Yuan Yang and Lucy Hornby, “China Raises Alarm Over Its Dependency on Imported Chips,” Financial Times, July 18, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/410306d8-8ae0-11e8-bf9e-8771d5404543; and “China to Import $300 Billion of Chips for Third Straight Year: Industry Group,” Reuters, August 26, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-semiconductors/china-to-import-300-billion-of-chips-for-third-straight-year-industry-group-idUSKBN25M1CX.
