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raises a very strong presumption against its ever having had legal existence;" although afterward she candidly says, "there is no doubt that in many statutes ' man' may properly be held to mean woman." I have proved that the very words of the common law and of the statutes creating the franchise apply indifferently to women as to men—that the only presumption contended for against woman's rights is non-user, and that non-user never renders public rights obsolete.
There is nothing further to examine in the rationes decidendi of the Court against the right, but the attempt the Judges make to govern and override the Statute of 1867 by the Act of 1832. They say the Act of 1832 restricts the right to male persons. And, first, that is perfectly untrue. It confines, indeed, the franchises then for the first time created to male persons, but it is careful to extend the qualifications theretofore created to "persons," rigidly omitting the word "male" in every instance in which it continues these in force. They further contend that by the fifty-ninth section of the Statute of 1867, it is provided that it shall be construed as one with the Act of 1832. Even that statement is untrue. The section declares that "This Act, so far as is consistent with the tenor thereof,shall be construed as one with the enactments for the time being in force relating to the representation of the people." Mark—it is only so far as consistent with its own tenor it is to be so construed,which practically explodes the pretended restrictions of its interpretation. But further,the construction is not to be limited by the Act of 1832; the plural term enactments is employed, and extends the construction to all those enfranchising statutes which do not suggest one syllable of qualification as to sex, and neither use the words "man" nor "male,"but "people,"" freeholder," and "person." But to pour water on this drowned rat, the 56th section of the Act of 1867 provides that " the franchises conferred by this Act shall be in addition to, and not in substitution for any existing franchises." It is true, Byles, J., contends, that "Acts in pan materia are to receive the like construction; " but he fails to tell us which half of the Act of 1832 we are to take to accomplish this feat—the half which gives the new franchise to male persons, or the other half which continues the old franchises to persons, and leaves "male "out in the cold. The
