certain cheer in the House of Commons make a general panegyric on economy; if you want to invite a sure defeat, propose a particular saving.” The process is simple. Every expenditure of public money has some apparent public object; those who wish to spend the money expatiate on that object; they say, “What is 50,000l. to this great country? Is this a time for cheeseparing objection? Our industry was never so productive; our resources never so immense. What is 50,000l. in comparison with this great national interest?” The members who are for the expenditure always come down; perhaps a constituent or a friend who will profit by the outlay, or is keen on the object, has asked them to attend; at any rate, there is a popular vote to be given, on which the newspapers—always philanthropic, and sometimes talked over—will be sure to make encomiums. The members against the expenditure rarely come down of themselves; why should they become unpopular without reason? The object seems decent; many of its advocates are certainly sincere: a hostile vote will make enemies, and be censured by the journals. If there were not some check, the “people’s house” would soon outrun the people’s money.
That check is the responsibility of the Cabinet for the national finance. If any one could propose a tax, they might let the House spend it as it would, and wash their hands of the matter; but now, for whatever expenditure is sanctioned—even when it is sanctioned against the ministry’s wish—the ministry must find the money. Accordingly, they have the strongest motive to oppose
