sive. The members of the federal government will have no agency in carrying the state constitutions into effect. The members and officers of the state government, on the contrary, will have an essential agency in giving effect to the federal constitution. The election of the president and senate, will depend in all cases, on the legislatures of the several states. And the election of the house of representatives will equally depend on the same authority in the first instance; and will, probably, for ever be conducted by the officers, and according to the laws of the states.
4. Among the provisions for giving efficacy to the federal powers, might be added, those which belong to the executive and judiciary departments: but as these are reserved for particular examination in another place, I pass them over in this.
We have now reviewed in detail, all the articles, composing the sum or quantity of power, delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal government; and are brought to this undeniable conclusion, that no part of the power is unnecessary or improper, for accomplishing the necessary objects of the union. The question, therefore, whether this amount of power shall be granted or not, resolves itself into another question, whether or not a government commensurate to the exigencies of the union, shall be established; or, in other words, whether the union itself shall be preserved.
Publius.
No. XLV.
By James Madison.
A further discussion of the supposed danger from the powers of the union, to the state governments.
Having shown, that no one of the powers transferred to the federal government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several states.
