which ought to have governed the structure of that department, and which were necessary to the perfection of the system. If some partial inconveniences should appear to be connected with the incorporation of any of them into the plan, it ought to be recollected, that the national legislature will have ample authority to make such exceptions, and to prescribe such regulations, as will be calculated to obviate or remove these inconveniences. The possibility of particular mischiefs can never be viewed, by a well-informed mind, as a solid objection to a principle which is calculated to avoid general mischiefs, and to obtain general advantages.
Publius.
No. LXXXI.
By Alexander Hamilton.
A further view of the judicial department, in relation to the distribution of its authority.
Let us now return to the partition of the judiciary authority between different courts, and their relations to each other.
"The judicial power of the United States is to be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish."[1]
That there ought to be one court of supreme and final jurisdiction, is a proposition which is not likely to be contested. The reasons for it have been assigned in another place, and are too obvious to need repetition. The only question that seems to have been raised concerning it, is, whether it ought to be a distinct body, or a branch of the legislature. The same contradiction is observable in regard to this matter, which has been remarked in several other cases. The very men who object to the senate as a court of impeachments, on the ground of an improper intermixture of powers, are advocates, by implication at least, for the propriety o vesting the ultimate decision of all causes, in the whole or in a part of the legislative body.
- ↑ Article 3, Sect. 1.
