towards his avowed object, which is to work out a prerogative for the executive to judge, in common with the legislature, whether there be cause of war or not in a public obligation, it is to be presumed that "in faithfully executing the laws of neutrality," an exercise of that prerogative was meant to be included. On this supposition the inference, as will have been seen, does not result from his own premises, and has been already so amply discussed, and, it is conceived, so clearly disproved, that not a word more can be necessary on this branch of his argument.
No. III.
In order to give colour to a right in the executive to exercise the legislative power of judging whether there be a cause of war in a public stipulation. . . .two other arguments are subjoined by the writer to that last examined.
The first is simply this:
"It is the right and duty of the executive to judge of and interpret those articles of our treaties which give to France particular privileges, in order to the enforcement of those privileges;"
from which it is stated as a necessary consequence, that the executive has certain other rights, among which is the right in question.
This argument is answered by a very obvious distinction. The first right is essential to the execution of the treaty as a law in operation, and interferes with no right vested in another department. The second, viz. the right in question, is not essential to the execution of the treaty or any other law; on the contrary, the article to which the right is applied cannot, as has been shewn, from the very nature of it, be in operation as a law without a previous declaration of the legislature; and all the laws to be enforced by the executive remain in the mean time precisely the same, whatever be the disposition or judgment of the executive. This second right would also interfere with a right acknowledged to be in the legislative department.
