examined it will be found that most of the disputes arose at this critical point. Men were usually not willing to carry their failure to secure election to the point of war unless they happened to be at the critical fourth generation when that failure meant the extinction of their whole line from royal rights. And when it so fell out that three separate dynasties claimed those rights, it is fairly clear that the critical moment would always be arising, or always be threatened.
It is speculation to suggest how this would have been remedied had the State been left free to work out its own destiny. Clearly the executive would either have become frankly hereditary or frankly elective. Probably at that time it would have become hereditary, especially as the son generally claimed to succeed from his father unless there were special reasons why he should not or could not. But then, what of the kings of stateships and territories? Had these also become hereditary th% State from top to bottom would have become impossibly rigid; but there are reasons to suggest why this would not have been so. For one thing, the kings of stateships were elected by the voice of the freemen, whereas the kings of the higher executives were elected by their own courts. Moreover, the stateships served immediate and local needs that required the consent of the freemen for their continual adjustment. The two operating together would undoubtedly have compelled, without any of the complications of a righ-damhna, the perfectly free election of the executive head and
