with living issues. Within the body of the existing law each special interest would be the arbiter of its own affairs. When fresh legislation became necessary by changed conditions, or through other causes, its council would discuss it, formulate it, and be responsible through its president for the initiative of bringing it before the Assembly of the Nation.
A system such as this, as has been said, would bring into joint operation two kinds of representation: the representation of special interests and the representation of the whole people. Clearly they would require a solvent and a corrective. New legislation might be initiated by a council and be considerably altered by the Assembly. This would naturally only be the case in extreme cases, for the will of such councils would naturally have a far higher authority than the sole will of one man in consultation with permanent officials. Yet the contingency would have to be provided for. For the council might reject the amended form of its wish, as it would have the right to do. Or the Assembly might reject the suggestion altogether, or compel its withdrawal, with the result that the initiative might be repeated. Very properly the final decision would rest with the Assembly, for it would be responsible not to special interests, but to the whole Nation. Yet the councils would equally require some further court to which to appeal on the argument that no Assembly at all times and in all cases represents a nation's will, however frequently it be elected. They
