which is the worse class of sellers, those who expect and are willing to be "beaten down," or those who, as we have seen, aim to play upon ignorance, carelessness, or extravagance, rather than by supplying what every customer needs at a fair profit, to earn a fortune in slow-coach fashion. The splendid success of such men as Mr. A. T. Stewart, demonstrates the wisdom, as well as the justice, of unvarying prices. I have a kind of belief (or, at least, hope) that the one-price trader goes to Heaven.
THE ALABAMA AGAIN.
The Report of the British Neutrality Commission could hardly have avoided reviving the Alabama discussion in the London press—at all events, it did not avoid reviving it. One of the strange concomitants of this fresh discussion is a term the London "Times" has coined to describe vessels of the Alabama sort, namely, "neutral pirates." Another striking feature is an allusion to the theory that Great Britain might have recognized the belligerency of the Confederate States on land and not on sea—a point made by Mr. Bemis. This last seems to have a connection with what was formerly suggested in a "Drift-Wood" note, that the British Neutrality Proclamation of 1861 recognized the Sothern States simply upon their political act of secession.
It will not be necessary to repeat what was then urged, regarding the irrelevancy of this branch of the subject to the main issue involved in the Alabama case. But should this latter be put before a mixed commission, as now seems possible, and should Mr. Seward carry his point of conducting the evidence on his own plan, now so familiar, we can perhaps imagine a line of argument in which this point of the recognition of States might be made the subject of discussion, if not of adjudication. The argument, as already put thus far, and and as it could be continued, might perhaps be roughly laid out, in one form, as follows:
United States. You are accountable for the Alabama and her ravages, through your so-called proclamation of neutrality, because you thereby substantially declared that the Confederates possessed naval officers, bearing naval commissions; and hence, if they should be able to get ships and men anywhere (as, for instance, by evading your own foreign enlistment act) then there would exist a Confederate navy, to be treated on an equality with that of the United States. You thus laid the foundation for a naval force for them.
Great Britain. We did nothing more than you yourselves did.
United States. We recognized the Confederates after the fact. That is to say, when they had a force in the field, we recognized it as an army, and not as a band of marauders. And we were ready, when a naval force, or a ship armed and officered, should appear, to give the crew the benefit of the laws of war. But you went beyond this. You recognized the naval capacity of the Confederacy in the first instance. In this present case of the Alabama, you thereby gave Semmes the status of a naval officer under commission, before the fact.
Great Britain. We suggest that you refresh your memory by reading over your own blockade proclamation.
United States. Yes; but that related only to the land force.
Great Britain. Well, after all, we only recognized the Confederate belligerency when you did—that is to say, so nearly at the same time that we are not subject to reproof for the difference of days. If that recognition was construed by other people to give a naval character, as you represent, to Semmes and his officers, how are we responsible?
United States. Because, unlike us, you recognized "certain States" as belligerent parties on their political acts, independently of any knowledge of the forces actually operating by land or by sea; and you placed them, as far as you were concerned, in all respects on the footing of a nation—that is, of a Power capable of authorizing a navy and issuing naval commissions, before a keel was laid.
