of government under which the compact was entered into, should be substantially maintained. But this authority extends no further than to a guarantee of a republican form of government, which supposes a preëxisting government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the states, they are guaranteed by the federal constitution. Whenever the states may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guarantee for the latter. The only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange republican for anti-republican constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance."
Mr. S. thought that those two clauses, when supported by such high authority, had they been the only ones in the constitution which related to the powers of the general government over the states, and particularly at their formation and adoption into the Union, could not but be deemed satisfactory to a reasonable extent; but there were other provisions in the constitution, to which he would refer, that beyond all doubt, to his mind, settled the question. One of those was the tenth article in the amendments, which said that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the people." He believed that, by common law and common usage, all grants giving certain defined and specific privileges or powers, were to be so construed as that no others should be intended to be given but such as were particularly enumerated in the instruments themselves, or indispensably necessary to carry into effect those designated. In no part of the constitution was the power proposed to be exercised, of imposing conditions on a new state, given, either in so many words, or by any justifiable or fair inference; nor in any portion of the constitution was the right prohibited to the respective states to regulate their own internal police, of admitting such citizens as they pleased, or of introducing any description of property that they should consider as essential or necessary to their prosperity; and the framers of that instrument seem to have been zealous, lest, by implication or by inference, powers might be assumed by the general government over the states and people, other than those expressly given: hence they reserve in so many terms to the states and the people, all powers not delegated to the federal government. The ninth article of the amendments to the constitution still further illustrated the position he had taken; it read that "the enumeration in the constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Mr. S. believed it to be a just rule of interpretation, that the enumeration of powers delegated to congress weakened their authority in all cases not enumerated; and that beyond those powers enumerated they had none, except they were essentially necessary to carry into effect those that were given. The second section of the fourth article of the constitution, which declared that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states," was satisfactory, to his judgment, that it was intended the citizens of each state, forming a part of one harmonious whole, should have, in
