the right of the people of the slave states to emigrate to the territories with their slaves as property is necessary to afford such a participation on their part, inasmuch as the people of the free states emigrate into the sam« territories with their property. And the argument deduces from this right the principle that, if congress exclude slavery from any part of this new domain, it would be only just to set off a portion of the domain — some say south of 36° 30', others south of 34°— which should be regarded at least as free to shivery, and to be organized into slave states.
Argument ingenious and subtle, declamation earnest and bold, and persuasion gentle and winning as the voice of the turtle dove when it is heard in the land, all alike and altogether have failed to convince me of the soundness of this principle of the proposed compromise, or of any one of the propositions on which it is attempted to be established.
The constitution does not expressly affirm anything on the subject; all that it contains is two incidental allusions to slaves. These are, first, in the provision establishing a ratio of representation and taxation; and, secondly, in the provision relating to fugitives from labor. In both cases, the constitution designedly mentions slaves, not as slaves, much less as chattels, but as persons. That this recognition of them as persons was designed is historically known, and I think was never denied.
I deem it established that the constitution does not recognize property in man, but leaves that question, as between the states, to the law of nature and of nations. That law, as expounded by Vattel, is founded on the reason of things. When God had created the earth, with its wonderful adaptations, He gave dominion over it to man, absolute human dominion. The title of that dominion, thus bestowed, would have been incomplete, if the Lord of all terrestrial things could himself have been the property of his fellow-man.
But there is yet another aspect in which this principle must be examined. It regards the domain only as a possession, to be enjoyed either in common or by partition by the citizens of the old states. It is true, indeed, that the national domain is ours. It is true it was acquired by the valor and with the wealth of the whole nation. But we hold no arbitrary authority over it. We hi)ld no arbitrary authority over anything, whether acquired lawfully or seized by usurpation. The constitution regulates our stewardship; the constitution devotes the domain to union, to justice, to defense, to welfare, and to liberty
But there is a higher law than the constitution, which regulates our authority over the domain, and devotes it to the same noble purposes. The territory is a part, no inconsiderable part, of the common heritage of mankind, bestowed upon them by the Creator of the Universe. We are his stewards, and must so discharge our trust as to secure in the highest degree their happiness
It remains only to remark that our own experience has proved the danger ous influence and tendency of slavery. All our apprehensions of dangers, present and future, begin and end with slavery. If slavery, limited as it yet is, now threatens to subvert the constitution, how can we, as wise and prudent statesmen, enlarge its boundaries and increase its influence, and thus increase
