172 Journal of Philology. truth. " Men," says Aristotle, Rhet. il. 24. ult. " were justly in- dignant at this ^r(i>86t tc yap eort, koi ovk dXrjOes, aa (paivoptvov, kcu cv ovdffiiq rtxvj] aXX* Iv faropiKJ} koi fpiaTucrj" So that in the opinion of that great master of the Art of Rhetoric, the Protagorean practice was no art at all, but only another of the Sophistical " shams," immoral, and justly censurable. As to the representa- tion of Protagoras' character and opinions in the Platonic dia- logue of that name, I have already observed that Plato's object in general and certainly in this particular dialogue is rather to exhibit the Sophists in the light of impostors who have under- taken to teach what they themselves do not understand, than in that of immoral and unprincipled men in any other sense. But I may observe that Protagoras' own statement of what he pro- fesses to teach, which Mr Grote, p. 521, appeals to as " a large scheme of practical duty," " good counsel in their domestic and family relations, and how best to qualify themselves to speak and act in public life" (which is a truer rendering of 7rep! u rfc TroXecay, onus to r?)s 7r6fa>s dwarcoTaros etr) kcu irparTfiv Ka cyeiv than "to speak and act... for the weal of the city") does not neces- sarily include any moral considerations: and indeed the object which the two most profligate men of the day in Athenian esti- mation, Alcibiades and Critias, had in view when they sought the company of Socrates is expressed by Xenophon in precisely the same terms, Mem. I. 2. 15. voplaavre, et 6ptr]aatTT]u ckciVg), yevfadat tw IxavoiTaTO) Ae'yi re koL irparrav. Gorgias' instruction in virtue- to pass on from Protagoras to the next of the Sophists in dis- tinction and importance was of a very similar kind. His defi- nition of "a man's virtue" as described by Meno, who shares his opinions, (Men. 71. d. e.) is "to be qualified to take a part in public business, and in doing so to serve his friends and injure his enemies, whilst he takes good care to secure himself against all risk of the like." A woman's virtue, again, is " to manage the household affairs discreetly, to be thrifty and obedient to her husband." From this division of male and female virtue, one might perhaps infer that in Protagoras' " scheme" " the good counsel in domestic and family relations" belonged to the softer sex, whilst the virtue of the man was to be exercised exclusively in public affairs ; but, not to press this point, I cannot but think that this de- finition of virtue by Gorgias is, in a moral point of view, of a some- what negative character. It certainly is not in itself immoral,
