r The Sophists. 187 instructed their pupils in the art of arguing with equal plausibility on either side of a question, and appear to have set them a bril- liant example by talking themselves for effect without any pretence of a scientific object or endeavour to arrive at the truth. What was there in common between them and Socrates but their office of instructors ? It may be said that they held in common the Eudaemonistic theory of Ethics, which assigns utility or one's own interest as the end of virtue. See especially Memor. iv. 6, 8, 9. Explained as Socrates explained it, that men were to look to the interest of others as well as their own ; and guarded as he guarded it by his doctrine that virtue is wisdom, i. e. a comprehensive view of one's own highest interest, which includes attention to the rights of others and a consideration of our obligations to them ; the theory, though faulty in itself, was not likely to prove mischievous in practice : whereas the testimony of the ancient writers them- selves the best informed and contemporary writers has shown us that the Sophists disseminated unsound principles which natu- rally led to the disregard of social and moral obligations. Finally I will attempt to anticipate an objection which arises from the connection of men like Alcibiades and Critias, and the " Sophists" Aristippus and Antisthenes, with Socrates. As re- gards the two first, the charge was actually made by his accu- sers on his trial and mainly instrumental in bringing about his condemnation. To it Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 12, sq. replies, that Alcibiades and Critias came to Socrates with no intention of profiting by his instruction in any other way than by catching if they could his wonderful skill and subtlety in argument, which enabled him " to do whatever he pleased with all that conversed with him ;" to be employed by them in the law-courts and public assemblies : that they sought nothing but distinction, and were by nature indisposed to listen to exhortations to virtue : and to oppose to these he produces (1. c. 48) a list of exemplary cha- racters who did profit by Socrates' moral lessons, " and of whom not one, young or old, either did any harm or was ever accused of it." With respect to Aristippus the same reply may be made, he was a profligate unprincipled man who loved nothing but his own ease and enjoyment, deserted his master and friend in the hour of need, and was doubtless incapable of deriving benefit from the
