Naturally these men were also among the most earnest and convinced advocates of the revived movement for a League of Nations. Their support was needed to give it life. The price of their support was the incorporation of their special policy in the new programme. The price was gladly paid; but, at first, it certainly was not measured. The failure to diagnose the full meaning of Freedom of the Seas, and the even deeper failure to penetrate the actualities of Naval Warfare, prevented men observing how far the two conceptions were incompatible, if not mutually destructive.
As every one knows, Freedom of the Seas is an expression very loosely used, and with many shades of meaning, but for practical purposes it is enough to fix its content, as conceived by those who imported it into the programme for a League of Nations. The moment we endeavour to do this we are confronted by a paradox. It is obvious that Freedom of the Seas can only relate to a state of war. In time of peace all seas are free. Since the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Baltic and Black Seas were finally thrown open to commerce, there has been no mare clausum, and except for such international regulations as have been agreed upon for the safety and facility of navigation, all men are free to pass the seas at their pleasure. It is only in relation to a state of war that there are any restrictions. If then a League of Nations can attain its object in preventing war the
