after the Chemnitz conference, and entirely reversed matters, we should have entered upon a fight which would have brought us decisive retreat with the result that all question as to the possibility of a victory of the proletariat would have been impossible for many years to come. I personally assume all responsibility for the retreat. I go further: in a similar situation I would have behaved in exactly the same way. We consulted with the Executive. We believed that we could make Central Germany a marching off place, that from defence we could pass to attack, and thence to the fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The Executive in September gave its complete consent to this plan. The plan was correct, but in estimating the relation of forces, we—the Executive Committee of the Communist International and the Central Committee of the German Communist Party alike—made a mistake. We chose the easiest path for the victory of the revolution. The victory, however, is somewhat more difficult. What was the estimate of the relation of forces on the basis of which we chose this relatively easiest path? In order to make this clear, I must deal with the events which took place during the occupation of the Ruhr.
The Leipsic Party Congress coincided with the beginning of the Ruhr occupation. It was clear to us that the occupation of the Ruhr would be of decisive importance for the development of events in Germany and for the German revolution.
(Hesse and Mastov: But nothing was said about it.)
This question was clearly dealt with by us in the manifesto and by Comrade Zetkin in her report.
(R. Fischer: At the public meeting.)
The manifesto was adopted unanimously at the Party Congress. It was therefore not at the public meeting; it was the expression of opinion of the Party Congress, and in fact this point of view was documented at the ceremonial session.
We defined our attitude on this matter in the political report also. In this report I stated that we could not foresee whether we should remain long in the trough of the revolutionary wave in which we then were, or whether the occupation of the Ruhr would bring us on to a new rising revolutionary wave. There was not one among you then who was wiser than I, and who could have declared that we were certainly going to rise on a revolutionary wave. And in the theses, which were adopted by the majority, I declared that we must be prepared for both possibilities. The Party policy was carried on on the basis of this decision of the Leipsic Party Congress. What was this policy? It was that we could at first mobilise the masses against the Ruhr occupation only with difficulty. We could not get them to rise against the occupation. They were not moved by the broad national tumult; only the petty-bourgeoisie was to any extent nationalist and nationally aroused. We had, before attempting to create a movement, to grope for what would arouse the masses and make them
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