rise of the revolutionary wave, the impulse forward of the workers, the mood of the workers on the one hand and of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party on the other. Every single action proved this. We attempted in each case to develop our own standpoint, to make it clear from February to October that the Ruhr fight was the introduction of a new period, and that the question of power was on the order of the day. At the Wasserkante District Congress Brandler called us idiots, because we failed to understand that the next stage in Germany was a Left Social-Democratic and trade union workers' government, and that there was time enough for bringing the question of power to the fore. In his opinion the latter ought to be avoided.
The Executive of Comintern realised that historically the possibility of the seizure of power was on the order of the day and that the bourgeoisie were attempting a decisive attack against the working class, and not against the November Republic.
The contradiction between the fact that the Executive of Comintern somewhat differently from the German Communist Party understood the united front tactic as a method of winning the masses to Communism, and what we actually experienced in Germany, led to the fact that we had later to reproach ourselves for the collapse.
When the Party representatives returned from Moscow, one of them spoke in Berlin and declared that in three days we should have power in Saxony, and then we should march on Berlin.
Comrades, this characteristic distortion in practice of the decisions of the Communist International proved that the Party had not the strength to fight as a revolutionary party, let alone to fight for power. The characteristic feature of the policy of the German Communist Party, according to Brandler, was that it over-rated the revolutionary forces in October. The more the Reich fell asunder and the more the inflation crisis developed into economic disruption, the more it was declared that the relation of forces was against us. Yet so much was talked of civil war in August. When, however, we were obliged to fight, the Central Committee suddenly discovered that the forces at its disposal were not sufficient for a fight.
That is typical opportunism: when the time comes for attacking, it is discovered that forces are not sufficient. After the opportunity has passed the revolution is promised in three months. This is typical German trade union tactics.
Comrades, the October defeat culminated in two points—in Hamburg and in Saxony. The contrast between the Chemnitz Conference and the fight of the Hamburgers is so great that the Party was unable to pass it over. As regards Saxony, the situation was systematically and deliberately misrepresented to the Party and to the International. Comrades, I say that whoever thinks that Brandler did not know that weapons were not to be secured in Saxony, does not understand him. He consciously carried on
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