tradiction, but have rather concealed it by lengthy phrases, and have thus opened the door for misinterpretations. We think that the political theses betray the following very serious defects:
They give an incomplete and partly incorrect presentation of the causes which led to the October defeat.
They have not explained why the "Saxon experiment" miscarried; What in reality were the mistakes committed; and what were the effects of the experiment as a whole.
They fail to declare in an unambiguous manner whether under the existing circumstances the party was right in not taking up the armed struggle. They say nothing as to what mass actions the party should have taken in order to cover the retreat.
They do not contain the necessary criticism of the errors and defects of the policy of the so-called "left party opposition" and thereby make it extraordinarily difficult to get the opposition to abandon their errors and to secure co-operation between the party majority and the opposition.
The political theses are not calculated to put an end to the differences within the German Communist Party, and they give the sections of the Communist International no adequate picture of the October events and their consequences and lessons.
The undersigned therefore expect that the Enlarged Executive will devote its attention to the October events and revise the theses which have been adopted.
On the other hand, the theses on the trade unions and on organisation correspond with the views of the majority of the party, and the Central Committee and the undersigned were able to vote in favour of them.
Although the undersigned earnestly maintain views above set forth regarding the political theses, nevertheless in the summary vote of the three theses on the German Question, they voted in favour of the decision of the Executive as a whole, because the theses adopted on the trade unions and on organisation are of the greatest importance for the practical work of the party. The undersigned acted in the conviction that, in view of the forthcoming difficult struggles of the proletariat against fascism, unity in the leadership and the membership of the German Communist Party is urgently necessary. The Party can become the revolutionary leader in these struggles of the working class and of all sections of the population, whose interests have come to clash sharply with those of the bourgeoisie only if it comes forward in agitation, propaganda, and action, in the clearest and most resolute manner as a united communist party displaying maximum revolutionary activity, and calling forth maximum activity on the part of the masses in the fight for power and for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
The undersigned regard it as their clear duty, and the duty of all comrades who share their point of view, to maintain iron discipline and to help the leaders to mobilise the Party and the
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