bring the whole proletariat into the revolutionary fighting front, the Party initiated and supported local councils of action everywhere. Intensive agitation was carried on among the railwaymen, electrical workers, and state and municipal workers.
The Executive of the Communist International concentrated the whole of the International, and particularly the sections of the countries adjacent to Germany, and of Soviet Russia on the impending German revolution, and settled the duties of the individual Sections.
3. The October Retreat and its Causes
In October, the German Communist Party, despite its weaknesses, was prepared for the revolutionary fight for power. If, in spite of the revolutionary situation, and in spite of the exertions of the Communist International and the German Communist Party, neither a revolutionary decisive struggle, nor political mass struggles resulted, this was due to a number of errors and defect, and in part, to opportunist deviations.
Defects in Estimating the Revolutionary March of Events
The Party realised too late that the revolutionary situation in Germany had matured. The Executive of the Communist International also failed to draw attention energetically enough to the oncoming crisis, with the result that the necessary fighting measures were not taken in hand in time. Already, with the end of the preceding period (Cuno Government, occupation of the Ruhr), the question of power should have been raised and the technical preparations should have been undertaken. The Party failed to realise in time the significance of the mass struggles in the Ruhr and in Upper Silesia, as a sign of increased consciousness of power and growing political activity, and only after the strike against Cuno was the necessary readjustment of attitude made.
Tactical Errors
The task of intensifying and broadening the numerous isolated actions which took place between July and September and to develop them right up to actions with political slogans, was not fulfilled.
After the Cuno strike the mistake was made of wanting to put off elemental movements until the decisive struggle took place.
One of the most serious errors was that the instinctive rebellion of the masses was not transformed into a conscious revolutionary will to fight by giving it political aims.
The Party failed in making an energetic and vigorous agitation for the tasks of the political workers' councils, and in connecting most closely the transitional demands and the partial struggles with the final aim of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The neglect of the factory councils' movement also made it impossible to place upon them temporarily the functions of workers' councils, so that
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