Lord Aberdeen humbly presumes to offer his most cordial congratulations to your Majesty on the great intelligence received by telegraph this morning. The account sent by Lord Stratford of the victory on the Alma must be correct; the report mentioned by Mr Colquhoun[1] may possibly be so too. At all events, we may fairly hope that the fall of Sebastopol cannot long be delayed.
Lord Aberdeen has written to Lord Clarendon this morning on the subject of the fortifications of Sebastopol, which although somewhat embarrassing at the moment, is not attended with any great practical importance.
Lord Aberdeen regrets that the speedy return of the post prevents him from sending your Majesty a copy of his letter, which in substance, however, was to the following effect. Without attaching any undue importance to the decision, he was inclined to adhere to his first proposition of the immediate and entire destruction of the works. He did not see the advantage of doing the thing by halves ; while the destruction of the sea defences only might give rise to erroneous impressions and would be of an equivocal character. The fall of Sebastopol would in fact be the conquest of the Crimea, and the Allies might winter there with perfect security, as, by occupying the lines of Perekop,[2] any access to the Crimea would effectually be prevented by land. Lord Aberdeen thought that with a view to peace, and the restitution of the Crimea to Russia, it would be more easy for the Emperor to accept the destruction of the fortifications when accomplished, than to agree to any stipulation having such an object.
On the whole, Lord Aberdeen was inclined to think that if the place should not be at once destroyed, it might be better to preserve it in its present state, until the matter should be further considered. The Allies would always have it in their power to act as they thought best, and the question might in some degree be affected by future events. The great objection to leaving the matter undecided for the present appeared to be from the possibility of differences hereafter between France and England upon the subject. After the astounding proposition made to Lord Raglan by the French Generals, when actually embarked and at sea, it would be well to leave nothing in doubt. The Turks, too, might perhaps desire to have a voice in the matter, and might become troublesome. . . .
