archal system, where the sole thought of the Little Father is the welfare of the millions of his people, and where the acknowledged grace of the throne is accepted as the proof of the general practice. It is easy to produce striking effects with strong pigments. There would be a ready and startling sensationalism in a vivid picture of terrors and in a flaming outburst of rhetoric. But, as generally happens, the truth lies between the extremes. It is not all black or all white, but it has its lights and its shadows, and the faithful delineator must sacrifice the bold outlines of a fanciful sketch for the more subdued tones of historic verity.
The character of autocratic rule manifestly depends very much on the character of the autocrat. It is true that in these modern days even the autocrat is largely the creature of conditions. Imperial will is molded and circumscribed by historic tendencies, by overmastering public opinion, and by the spirit of the age. But, on the other hand, the currents of national development fall into the eddies of personal impulse. With the vast machinery of a great modern nation autocracy becomes bureaucracy. But the autocrat makes the bureaucrats, and so determines the trend. There are settled traditions and tendencies in Russia, but they are affected and modified by the dominant temper and influence of the hour. When Russia passed from the scepter of Nicholas I to that of Alexander II she advanced from the virile and robust imperialism of an iron dictator to the progressive and expanding liberalism of an enlightened ruler. When she passed from the control of Alexander III to that of Nicholas II she went from the secure, harsh, rigorous sway of a firm, self-poised, austere monarch to the turbulent reign of a kind, well-meaning, and uncertain sovereign.
The present Czar is conscientious and devoted in public purpose and amiable and exemplary in personal life. He has been surrounded by conflicting influences, and each of the opposing forces has appeared at one time or another to be dominant. The Czar's disposition and tendency have been liberal, as was indicated in the noble impulse which convoked The Hague Conference. If at times there has been a backward movement it was because reactionary elements outside of the throne gained a temporary ascendancy, and if lamentable errors plunged the empire into a war for which she was so illy prepared, it was because irregular influences, outside of the ministry, that were mistakenly trusted, gave evil counsels.
As a rule, Russian ministers are not personal favorites, but are often able statesmen, marked for their places by capacity and fitness. Their commission comes, not from title of nobility, but from the higher title of brains. Curiously as it may cross the prevailing conception of the Russian system, many of them have sprung directly from the ranks of the people. M. de Giers, the astute Minister of Foreign Affairs, who succeeded Gortchakoff and who so long guided the foreign policy of his country, did not inherit rank or fortune. Equally without rank was Vishnegradski, the Minister of Finance, a remarkably able man, whose range of vision covered the finance of all nations, who carried on his table the first free-silver bill just as it was lying on the desks of the American Senate, and whose acute and profound observations, if they could have been properly reported, would have instructed and startled the American people. His successor, de Witte, who was so long the master spirit of the Russian government, who then fell into disfavor, and who in the present crisis appears to be again rising into favor and ascendancy, is no less a man of the people. He made his first mark as a subordinate railway official, and was rapidly promoted until he became the most power-
