world an that of gravity in the physical workl.
The llieoiy thus develo])ed is known as associa-
tionisni ; a theorv which .sees in the laws of as-
sociation the fundamental modes of mental
action.
Association lias now a different significance among writers on psychology. In the works to which we have referred it had not so much a psychological as an epistemological significance (see Epistemology) ; that is, it was regarded as a ])rinciple of explanation in our knowledge of tilings. As thus conceived, associationism implied an atomic arrangement of the mind, and furnished rather an external and mechanical means for putting the various elements of knowledge together than an intrinsic mode of Bjnithesis. It is only very gradually that the association of ideas has come to lose its philo- sophical flavor within psychology', and to repre- sent a grouping of mental processes instead of standing as an explanation of experience in gen- eral. But even within modern psychological sys- tems it has received so many shades of meaning that it is hard to define. It has stood (a) as the one mode of connection of ideas; or (h) as the sole condition of reproduction, i.e. the way in which 'past' ideas arc brought again to mind; or (c) as reproduction itself — as when one is said to associate black with s<n-row: linally (d) it has signified a particular kind of grouping of mental elements. Let us see in what directions these concejitions are open to criticism.
First of all, we will examine association as the one mode of connection of ideas. Tliis defini- tion of association is too narrow. Unless we are content to make association a perfectly arbitrary thing, we must extend it beyond ideas. Wlion, e.g. we look at stones, we se(?m to see a heavy, hard, rough, cold, resisting mass. What we actually see is, of course, only the 'look' of the stone: the shape, the color, and the brightness. We 'think in' the rest from what our jiast ex- perience has told us of the 'properties' of the stone. This 'thinking in' is just the same kind of an operation as is to be found in association. We have a sense-experience completed by idea- tional elements. (See Sexsatiox ; Idea.) Since llicre is no successive 'calling up' of the parts, and since we have not a grouping of idea with idea, it is plain that we cannot speak of an as.so- ciation of ideas. No; we must rather speak of this form of connection as a simultaneous asso- cifif ion.
From this simplest form of associative group- ing we pass by short stages to the succcssirr as- sociation, the association in which part follows part. Even here it need not be a sequence of ideas which is experienced. A perception may start the train. The sight of the stone may bring the verbal idea 'geology,' and this, in turn, the idea of the Carboniferous period, and so (jii. It is only in cases of abstraction — as in reverie — that our primitive pilot, perception, is ofi' dnty, and we are guided by the central nerv- ous jirocesses underlying ideation,
We may dismiss the theory that association is the sole cause of reproduction (the second defini- tion! by pointing out that the previous joining of ideas is not the only cause, for the reproduc- tion of one by the other. This may be due — to mention only two exceptions — to mood (we are likely to recall melancholy events when we are in a melancholy mood ) ; or to a similar relation which two ideas chance to have to a third (as when 'dog* reminds us of 'eat,' both standing in the class of domestic animals). But neither is association satisfactorily considered as repro- duction or recolleclion itself. It becomes in tliis case only a subheading under memory, and tells us nothing of the relation in consciousness of process to process. This leaves us with only our final definition, which says no more than that when sensational and ideational elements group themselves under certain conditions they may be said to associate. Association then becomes simply the form of grouping in which the ele- ments stand united. Let us IcMik more closely into this group. First, we must distinguish be- tween the processes which do the associating and the materials united in association. In the simultaneous association, it is always the sensa- tional elements which start the association. These it is in the case of the stone which make the perception a stone-perception instead of a table or a wall-perception. It may happen, however, that a tendency toward rejiroduetion of certain ideas wholly diverts the normal course of the association or the assimilation, as it may be called. Think, for example, of the apprehen- sive traveler who comes upon the stone in the dusk and takes it for a ghastly head. Or it may he mood, or sentiment, or temperament, or a violent emotion, which determines the course of the perception. Take, as an illustration, the transformation of the stone by poetic fancy into a treasure-casket or a plaything of the gods. When we look again, at the le^'cl of the suc- cessive associations, for the critical portion of the perception of idea, the part which does the associating, we find that it ina.v be a single ele- ment or the whole perception or idea which is the detennining factor. The red (sensation) in a sunset may bring the idea of blood ; or a geometrical figure (perception) may suggest the arrangement of petals in a flower; or a melody (perception) an opera in which it Iniij been sung. The consideration of association as a form of mental connection removes one more, dilliculty which the older associationism encountered. It makes a more intimate relation within a percep- tion or a train of ideas than the latter could posit. There is a unity in the associated mem- bers. We may even speak of ,a whole jierception . or train of ideas as being 'bright,' 'vivid.' 'pleasing,' as if it were a single thing. Tliis would hardly be appropriate if the connection were entirely external and simply brought the elements into mere juxtaposition.
If, now, we are to speak of 'laws of asso<'ia- tion,' we can mean only the conditions under which a given association is made. These con- ditions will stand in place of the regularity with which the environment brings together certain groups of stimuli and [iresents them to the organism. Conceiving <nir laws thus, we find that the old category of contiguity comes near- est to expressing the truth of the matter. Simi- larity is a very doubtful rubric. In the first place, the term is too indefinite to be of much service. Almost anything may be considered more or less similar to anything else, and it is very hard to see how simple likeness should de- termine an association. At least, greater like- ness does not .seem to mean greater associability. It seems to be possible, in every case, to reduce
