INTERPRETATION. 713 taining the legal effect of those words. According to these authorities, "the olUue of interpretation is analytic, that of construction is synthetic; tho office of the one is to get at facts, that of the other to group these facts and determine their legal meaning; interpretation is exploration, con- struction is induction." Or to puo the distinc- tion in another way. interpretation gives us the grammatical and logical signification of tho words and sentences under eonsidtaation ; while construction gives us their legal ellect by "the familiar judicial process of applying the law to the facts of the case." This distinction has not generally commended itself to the courts either of England or of this country, and is ignored or deliberately discarded by most sy.stematic writers ujjon law. It will not be observed in the further discussion of this topic. The terms will be used intercliangeably, as denoting the process of ascertaining the true import of a document having legal consequences. Interpreta- tion, as a separate branch of law, has its origin in the imperfections of language and the limita- tions of human thought and understanding. How imperfectly and even bunglingh' the average man expresses hims(df, not only in hurried memoranda, but in formal documents as well, is evidenced by the vast number of lawsuits brought to settle the meaning of such documents. The legal process of interpretation is required, not only because of confused thinking and obscure language on the part of speakers and writers, but because of the frequent misapprehensions of hearers or readers, due to mental limitations. If a writing has legal consequences; for example, if it is a constitution, or treaty, or statute, a will, a deed, or a contract, or if it contains an attack upon reputation or a right of property, provision is needed and has been made for deter- mining which of various interpretations shall prevail. Speaking generally, that determination rests with a court of justice, in a legal action properly brought before it for hearing and de- cision. If the form of words whose meaning is in doubt is a public writing, such as a provision of a statute, treaty, or constitution, the question of construction belongs exclusively to the judge. If it is a private writing, such as a contract, will, or deed, having in-culiar expressions in it which have, in particular places or trades, a known meaning attached to them, it is for the jury to .say what the meaning of those expres- sions is; but it is the function of the court to construe the instrument after this ascertainment by the jury of the true meaning of such peculiar expressions. This legal rule is due in part to the fact that in olden times, when law was in its formative stage, junus were frequently unable to read or write ; but in part, also, and perhaps more largely, to considerations of policy. A learned English judge once declared that unless this rule was followed "there would be no cer- tainty in the law; for a misconstruction by the court is the proper subject, by means of a hill of exceptions, of redress in a court of errors ; but a misconstruction by the jury cannot be set right at all efTectually." The rule has been supported by a distinguished legal writer upon other gnninds of gooil sense and expediency, ft is important, he remarks, that "most writings brought under judicial consideration should have a fixed meaning; should not be subject to varying interpretations; should be construed by INTERPRETATION. the tribunal which is most permanent, best in- structed, most likely to adhere to precedents." While the construction of a writing is ordinarily for the judge, and not for the jury, libel cases form an exception to the rule. Whether a par- ticular writing is such an attack upon reputation as to amount to a libel is for the jury to decide. In other words, the jury, and not the court, construe a writing which is alleged to be defamatory. Such at least is the doctrine in England in all cases of defanuition. and in this country in all criminal prosecutions for libel. It is to be borne in mind that the object of interpretation is not to di.scover the intention of parties to a transaction by the us(! of any and every legitimate means. Its purpose is nuich less ambitious; its scope much narrower. The problem for the interpreter is this: given certain language in which persons have professed to state their intention in a particular matter, what is the intention thus stated? It may be that the parties have used langua;.'e so carelessly that it fails to express any definite intention. In such a case interpretation is fruitless. It must stop short of accomplishing its object for want of materials. "All latitude of construc- tion," said Chief Baron Eyre in an oft-quoted decision, "must submit to this restriction ; name- ly, lliat the iconU mntj bear the sense which by construction is put upon them. If we step be- yond this law, we no longer construe men's deeds, but make deeds for them." It is not the office of interpretation, then, to add anything to the text of a writing. Its function is only to dis- cover and set forth what is in it. But a questior» arises at this point, upon which the authorities are not entirely in accord: What is to be deemed within and what without the text? It is some- times said that judges and writers in answering this question range themselves in two schools of interpreters: a liberal and a literal school. The former declare that everthing is in the text which a mind fully informed as to the circum- stances in which the writing was made, "and doing no violence to the rules of language and the rules of construction, may reasonably find there." The latter insist upon limiting inter- pretation to the meaning of the text itself. Perhaps no better statement of the prevailing view on this point has been made than the fol- lowing: "Interpretation is a process of reason- ing from probabilities, a process of remedying by a sort of equitable jurisdiction the imperfections of human language and powers of using lan- giuige. ,a process whose limits are necessarily indefinite, and yet continually requiring to be practically determined. It is not a mere opera- tion requiring the use of grammar and dic- tionaries, a mere inquiry into the meaning of words." So far as legal interpretation does make use of the rules of grammar and the laws of lan- guage, it docs not differ from the process eni- ])loyed by every educated and intelligent listener or reader when engaged in discovering the mean- ing of a speaker or writer. -Any legal rules, however, are peculiar to jiulicial interpretation. Some of them owe their existence to peculiarities of legal procedure : but most of them have been evolved by the courts with a view to producing greater uniformity in the terms of legal writings, or to lessening and shortening litigation, or to
