BECIPROCITY. 749 RECIPROCITY. countries; in 1860 by a Canadian delegation; in 1809 by Sir John Rose; in 1873 by George Brown and Sir Edward Thornton, and in 1800-92 by Hon. Robert Bond, all with no result. So also various bills and resolutions for reciprocity with Canada were tabled or voted down in Congress from time to time. Attempted amendment.-? to tariff bills met the same fate. The most recent development in the struggle for better trade rela- tions with Canada has been the appointment of the -Joint High Commission,' which was to settle all points in dispute between the two countries, including reciprocity. Its work has thus far had no result. An important experiment in reciprocity was undertaken in the treaty of 187.5 between the United States and Hawaii. The plan of annex- ing the Hawaiian Islands had been brought for- ward several times before 187.5, and one or two abortive efforts to secure a reciprocity treaty with them had been made. What finally forced the question upon the attention of Congress was the growing power of England in the Pacific, and the development of British trade with the islands, added to the fact that American citizens had ac- quired large holdings of land in Hawaii, and were desirous of receiving discriminating trade ad- vantages. The signal for action was given by in- ternal disturbances in the islands in 1874, and the accession of a king strongly favorable to American interests. A treaty was finally nego- tiated and was signed by the President April 17. 1875, going into effect .June 30. A bill to make the modifications of duties rendered necessary by the treaty was brought up and passed in the House of Representatives. By this treaty the United States admitted, free of duty, sugar and »a few tropical products, including rice, while Hawaii relieved of duty various kinds of agricul- tural and meat products as well as machiners' and other manufactures. At the time the treaty was adopted, our imports from Hawaii amounted to about $1,300,000 annually, our exports being a little over S600,000. Xo reduction in the price of sugar resulting, there naturally occuned a great increase in the price of sugar lands in Hawaii and a grreat growth in exports of sugar to the United States. This meant, of course, a corre- sponding loss of duties to our Government with- out anv compensating growth of exports to the I islands'. Our imports were $4,606,444 in 1880, $8,887,497 in 1885. .$12,313,908 in 1890. $7,888,961 in 1895, and $17,187,380 in 1898: as against ex- ports of $2,086,190. $2,787,922, $4,711,417, $3,- 723.057, and $5,907,155 during the same years, ilost of the imports were of sugar, and it was estimated that the duties lost to the United States during the life of the treaty ranged from $2,000,000 to $12,000,000 a year.' In 1883 the question of renewing the treaty (first con- cluded for seven years) came up in Congress and strong opposition to it was sho^vn; but a new agreement was finally ratified and put into ef- fect (December 7. 1887). The growth of hostile feeling displayed during this reciprocity struggle had, however, alaimed the sugar interests, who now began to fear the ultimate abrogation of their reciprocity privilege. This fear led to a vigorous annexation movement in the islands, re- » suiting eventually in the annexation of the islands in 1898. During the decade 1880-1890 reciprocity first began to be advocated in the United States as a definite tariff policy. The revision of the tariff by the Republicans in 1883 was unsatisfactory to the manufacturers, who were beginning to build up an export trade, and who wanted larger foreign markets. In 1883 a treaty was nego- tiated with Mexico, and in 1884 one with Spain for Cuba and Porto Rico, and another with Santo Domingo, were arranged, but they were all either killed or withdrawn bv Presi- dent Cleveland. In 1884 President "Arthur, under authority from Congress, sent a com- mission to visit the South American coun- tries and discuss the question of reciprocity with their governments. On its return, a report was made by the commission in which tariff reduc- tions on wool and sugar were laid down as a necessary basis for reciprocity with South Amer- ica, and practical failure in negotiations was re- ported as a result of the commission's lack of power to hold out promises of such concessions. About this time President Cleveland took oflSce (1885) and sought to secure general tariff re- vision, in place of further efforts to get reciprocity treaties. A Republican majority, however, ap- peared in the Congress which met in 1889, and that party concluded to act upon the recommenda- tion made by the South American commission that a Pan-American congress be summoned to discuss trade relations. Such a congress met in 1889 at Washington, under the title of the "In- ternational American Conference." This body favored reciprocity, but indicated that tariff treaties must be based upon real reductions of duty on important articles, ilany delegates ex- pressed great doubt as to the intentions of the United States in this respect, and the general re- sult of the conference was rather discouraging. A considerable surplus had been accumulated in the national treasury during the first Cleve- land administration, and it was desired by the Re- publicans on coming into office in 1889 to reduce incomes without lowering the tariff in general. This was done by the ^McKinley Act ( 1890 ) , which admitted raw sugar free of duty, and offered a bounty to domestic sugar-growers. At the same time, it was sought to appease our exporters (who wanted larger markets) by using the re- duction of sugar duties as a means of forcing corresponding reductions in foreign tariffs. This attempt was made in Sec. 3 of the McKinley Act, known as the reciprocity section, in which the President was ordered to impose specified duties upon raw sugar, molasses, coffee, tea, and hides, otherwise to be admitted free, unless the countries of origin should grant us compensating tariff con- cessions. These provisions had been brought about largely through the efforts of ilr. Blaine, who regarded some concessions to our agricul- tural and exporting interests as a political neces- sity. The principal article included in the reci- procity section was, of course, sugar; and this was admirably adapted for use as a basis for tariff' bargaining, because of the sugar bounty system of Europe. The bounty system had re- sulted in tremendous overproduction of sugar and had thus led to a great desire to find outside free markets for it. In the debate on the ilcKinley reciprocity section the meaning of the policy was explained with greater fullness than ever before. It was shown (1) that the products admitted to the United States must not compete with those
