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LATEST ASPECTS OF THE BRAZILIAN REBELLION.
171

this, Señor Peixoto was still farther removed from the suspicion of being actuated by a personal motive, inasmuch as his ineligibility was already established by the constitution, and in no way de-
pended on the bill, whether approved or not.

It is a pity that the personal ambition of Señor Custodio de Mello will not permit so satisfactory an explanation of his conduct; but it furnishes a very complete one of his political changes and of the blindness which led him to expect that a repetition of the twenty-third of November, 1891, would render it easy for him to breakfast on the “Aquidaban” and dine in the executive mansion. Fortunately for republican institutions in Brazil the circumstances were changed and the men were different, and the coup-de-main was a failure. The Congress at once authorized the government to declare a state of siege, furnished the execu-
tive with all necessary means for the defence of the national in-
stitutions, and, as the immediate representative of the nation, exhorted the States to continue united in defence of the constitu-
tion. The session was closed twenty days after the outbreak of the revolt.

Everything went wrong with the plans of the rebels ; con-
spirators like Señors de Mello and Ruy Barbosa must have relied upon promises of support which they did not receive, owing to the energy of the lawful powers. There are two facts which support this assertion. A few days after the outbreak of the re-
bellion, Señor Ruy Barbosa, who from the very first night had kept himself in hiding, deemed it prudent to flee to Montevideo, and a banker who is said to have loaned a large sum to the rebels under promise of payment within eight days, seeing the time of settlement indefinitely postponed, concluded that he would do a better business by killing himself.

The chief of the rebellion said nothing about a political alli-
ance with the monarchico-federalist rebels of the south ; and if credit be given to the revelations published in the press of Rio de Janeiro by Lieut. Brazilio Silvado, Señor de Mello would listen to no suggestion of alliance with Señor Saldanha da Gama, on account of the well-known monarchist opinions of the latter. As long as possible he avoided competitors for the lead in the movement; sent Captain Lorena to set up a Robinson Crusoe government in the Island of Desterro, on the coast of the State of Santa Catharina, and for such a government he had the hardi-