could not depend upon the support of the majority of his own party.
So instead of Saraiva, Ouro Preto became chief of the cabinet,
and the Brazilian monarchy, instead of bequeathing to history a
fair page of disinterested patriotism on which the person of
Pedro II. would have figured at the head of all monarchs, it left
that in which are recorded the thanks of Count d’Eu to the
provisional government for the settlement of the imperial succes-
sion for the sum of two and a half millions of dollars.
In its haste to carry into effect the original purposes of its pro-
gramme the historical republican party allied itself with the
military class, and, supported by it, unexpectedly proclaimed the
republic. The enterprise was not difficult, for the empire had
not a single defender left. Was it wisely or unwisely done ?
The answer is not easy to give. In the very Parliament elected
under the Ouro Preto ministry, Saraiva could have easily obtained
the predominance and carried out his plan for a federation
of the provinces, and the following legislature would have with
the same ease voted for the establishment of the republic. Such
would doubtless have been the dictate of prudence; as in that
case the new institutions would be the natural outgrowth of the
representative system. But what is done cannot be undone. If
the step was taken hastily, it was at least in the right direction.
The chief danger would be in looking backwards. The revo-
lution has given to Brazil republican institutions which must be
defended at all hazards, leaving whatever defects they may have
to be remedied by wisdom after the safety of those institutions
has been assured.
Were the republic as bad as its worst enemies paint it, it would still be preferable to any monarchy that could be set up on its ruins. No restoration, however, is now possible in Brazil.
The efforts to effect it would undoubtedly excite a civil war whose bitterness would be intense and duration indefinite, but whose result no republican can doubt.
Salvador de Mendonca.
