ars, whose production and importation greatly exceed the aggregate of all other articles, the treaty proposes to import free only those purchased by the refiners, and by none other; te duty to remain upon the rest, which is much the greater part, and which, as imported, is used in all our homes. The duty at present is said to be oppressive upon producers.
The islands are believed to contain 500,000 acres of arable and pasture land. Of this 100,000 acres are adapted to the sugar cane, but not above 20,000 are so cultivated, producing an average of 4,000 pounds per acre. Those islands sent to California, during the last fiscal year, 14,219,414 pounds, and other countries the balance of 40,000,000 pounds. Merchants in the Eastern States imported 810,000,000 pounds from other countries.
The advent hence to the Hawaiian Islands of capital, commercial enterprise and additional labor, sufficient to develope their resources, it is believed would be justified by the operation of the treaty. If this were practicable, the Islands might supply to us nearly one-half of the entire consumption of sugar in. the United States. And much might be said of the other productions of that country—molasses, paddy, rice, coflee, fungus, pulu, wool, cotton, hides, and tallow, and the various tropical fruits.
The mercantile activity at the islands has always been among the foreigners, and has been dependent almost wholly upon the activity and prosperity of the whalers who resort there for supplies and refreshment. That interest has declined much of late years, and a feeling is now prevalent there that some effort must be made or their commerce will entirely fail. i The treaty, therefore, has the support of
that class of the community. The king and government hope for its ratification also as of benefit to their country. The king himself is not personally friendly to the United States, from his chagrin at the treatment he received when travelling in
this country ten years ago, and where the all but "black prince" learned by experience, that "negroes were not allowed to sit at the fable d'hote;" while in England and on the continent he was received as one included within that divinity which "doth hedge a king." Most of his ministers and advisers also, being Englishmen, Frenchmen, and apostate Americans, apart from their certain loss of places of emolument in case of annexation, favor the treaty in opposition to real American interests, knowing that no idea of annexation to the republic could outlive the ordeal of prosperity which they think would obtain under the treaty. With all the commercial advantages of intercourse which exists between the states, why should any one there think of annexation?
The treaty would undoubtedly sustain the apparent falling fortunes of that kingdom, and would stimulate its planters and merchants to new activity. But that is no argument to us for its ratification. Moreover, a treaty is only ephemeral at best, and capital is too sensitive to emigrate with no security longer than seven years, the term fixed in this instrument. Halfof that time would pass before there could be any returns. And we look in vain, through the treaty, for any reciprocity. We can find as resulting to our country only the certain loss of all that duty upon imported articles which, in the event of the great predicted increase of commerce, under the treaty, would then come from those islands, which duty would otherwise amount annually to several millions of dollars. We see most of the energy of the islands devoted to the production of the inferior grades of sugars, and other articles in the schedule. We see no public gain compensate to our loss, and only the private emolument of a few manufacturers to whose manipulations we should all have to render compensation. We see all hope of acquisition of those lands slip through our hands, and the firmer estab
