we do not know; but that these evils must all have existed to a considerable degree, no man can doubt." p. xi.
But some will say that it appears these laws are obsolete; that judges, jury, all agree in not fulfilling them; that only one in eight are executed of all those condemned; and only one condemned in 1872. Granted; but why leave to the discretion of men, what every free nation requires should be exactly fixed; why set traps, that we may let down upon the unwary, or hold firm according as it may suit the prejudice of some or the advantage of others? Besides, has not this uncertainty a tendency to render crimes more frequent? Are not men apt to count uncertain future punishment as none? And does it not call for speedy attention, when we find that our juries are continually perjuring themselves in the cause of humanity? Does it not require some attention, when we hear our judges preaching the doctrines of perjury to the jury in the hearing of the multitude around them? Has not this a tendency to subvert morality, and to introduce the worst of vices; a playing with the most sacred of oaths, that taken in behalf of justice? That we may not be supposed to exaggerate, we again willingly quote from Sir Samuel Romilly the two following paragraphs, showing how much jurors are accustomed to give verdicts inconsistent with the evidence adduced, which is breaking their oath in the most material point.
"Some of the cases which occurred about this time are of such a kind that it is difficult to imagine by what casuistry the jury could have been reconciled to such a verdict: it may be proper to mention a few of them. Eliz. Hobbs was tried in September, 1732, for stealing in a dwelling-house one broad piece, two guineas, two half guineas, and 44 shillings in money: she confessed the fact, and the jury found her guilty; but found that the money stolen was only thrity-nine shillings. Mary Bradley, in May, 1732, was
