no need of other permission to defend his state against enemies who molest it, as we have proved.
In this war, the third condition, too—we shall speak of the second later—is fulfilled, namely, right intention; for its end is the peace and security of the subjects, disturbed by these their enemies. And this peace it has not been possible to secure by means of our benevolent efforts, although such means have been tried—as appears from our labors to that end last year in sending religious of our order, and persons known to the Zambales, to persuade them to desist from wrongdoing and be our friends, granting them a general pardon for the wrongs they had committed against us; and although the Zambales promised, and made oath in their fashion, they have defaulted utterly, committing since then many atrocious wrongs against our people, as appears from the reports on that matter which have been drawn up. And, forasmuch as nothing has been gained through kindness, comes now, as a last and drastic remedy, the resolution to win peace and security for the king's subjects by waging war on his enemies; and this is the right intention that is required according to Aristotle and St. Augustine, as before quoted. But even suppose this intention to be lacking, it is already said and proved above that this condition is not in such sort essential as to oblige to indemnification.
It remains that we look into the second condition of just warfare, to wit, that just cause exist for waging it. This condition, in which might be presented greatest difficulty, is the clearest and plainest part of the matter before us; for not only are some of the four causes and grounds pointed out by us, as being any one of them in itself sufficient, but all the just
