which they live—whether all these together constitute sufficient pretext for an expedient so severe as war; and if fire and sword are necessary.
To answer this doubt, we must admit that, with the diversities and natural features of countries, and with the characteristics of the peoples therein, is entwined most intimately the jus gentium, as we call it. Accordingly, in some lands some things are regarded as established, and classed with the jus gentium, but not in others; and some things lawful in certain lands are not so in others. On the contrary, things that would be wrong for some would be lawful and jus gentium for others; while things wrong for others would be lawful and honorable to the first, because of the diversity of countries, customs, and race, whence arises this jus gentium. Therefore we say that, if in Castilla, where neither the land nor people of these islands are known, this case were to be judged on only the things written and proved, nothing more than that these people were assaulters would be decided; and an order would be issued to proceed against them as against assaulters. If these things should happen in Sierramorena, no orders would be given to destroy the towns near by; or, if in the Pyrenees, for that reason war would not be declared upon the Gascons or Navarrese. For this would be esteemed a personal offense, and not one committed by the community. But here, where we know the land, the people, and their abominable and long-standing customs, we must esteem it, not a personal, but a communal offense; nor must we presume amendment where ferocity springs from custom, now rendered almost natural instinct, and from the land being unconquerable. Therefore it must be presumed that,
