affections of the people and the friendship of the nobles, for errors of this kind alone can lose a state capable of bringing an army into the field. Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but him who was defeated by Titus Quintius, was possessed of only a petty state, if compared with the territories of either Rome or Greece, whose combined effects he had to withstand; yet he resisted those great powers, and during the several years that the war lasted he lost only a few towns; but this prince was a warrior, and besides he knew how to make himself beloved by the peo- ple and esteemed by the great. It is not therefore to fortune that the princes of Italy ought to attribute the loss of their states, but to their cowardice and want of foresight. For they were so far from believing such a revolution in their fortunes, which is commonly the case with governments whose tranquillity has not been disturbed for some time, that when they saw the enemy approach they fled instead of defending themselves, vainly fancying that the people would feel impatient under the insolence of a conqueror, and not delay to recal them. This system, in default of every other resource, is undoubtedly good; but it is most shameful in a prince thus to neglect the honourable means of endeavouring to preserve his states, and ignobly fly, in the hope that you will recal him, though he has deserted you: a hope ridiculous and
