immediately suppressed, but I will come to the conclusion of this discourse by saying that the princes of our time have less difficulty than these of being obliged to satisfy in an extraordinary degree their soldiers in their states; for although they must have a certain consideration for them, yet it is soon settled, for none of these princes have armies that are inextricably bound up with the administration of the government and the rule of their provinces as were the armies of the Roman empire; and therefore if it was then necessary to satisfy the soldiers rather than the people, it was because the soldiers could do more than the people; now, it is more necessary to all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the people than the soldiers, for the people can do more than the soldiers. I except the Turk, because he always keeps about him twelve thousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry, on which depend the security and strength of his kingdom; and it is necessary for him to postpone every other consideration of the people to keep them friendly. It is the same with the kingdom of the Soldan, which being entirely in the hands of the soldiers, he is bound to keep their friendship regardless of the people. And it is to be noted that this state of the Soldan is different from that of all other princes, being similar to the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called either a hereditary kingdom or a new one, for the sons of the dead prince are not his heirs, but he who is elected to that position by those who have authority. And as this order is ancient it cannot be called a new kingdom, there being none of these difficulties which exist in new ones; as although the prince is new, the rules of that state are old and arranged to receive him as if he were their hereditary lord. But returning to our matter, I say that whoever studies the preceding argument will see that either hatred or contempt were the causes of
