THE REMINISCENCES OF CARL SCHURZ
the administration insisted upon keeping the anti-slavery tendency of the conflict in the background in order to spare the sensitiveness of the Union men in the border States and of the war Democrats, who would assuredly protest against the “war for the Union” being turned into “an abolition war.” But whether that caution was demanded, or even justified by the home situation, certain it is that it grievously impaired the moral strength which our cause would otherwise naturally have had in the world abroad.
Hardly anything could, in this respect, have been more important than the official interpretation of the national aspirations given by our Secretary of State, who was charged with the duty of speaking for us to the outside world. In fact, the operations of Seward's mind at this period may be ranked among the most curious puzzles of history. Having been regarded as one of the most radical anti-slavery men before Lincoln's election, he became, after that event, apparently, at least, one of the most timid. As appears from his private correspondence, since published, he regarded himself as appointed by Providence as well as by the tacit consent of both political parties to “compose” the trouble created by the secession movement. He seemed to believe that this composition might be effected by mutual concessions, by compromise with regard to slavery. But when the question arose what concession he would offer, it turned out that he could offer only the advice to let the slavery question alone and to think and talk of something else. He incurred the displeasure of the anti-slavery men by assuming the attitude of a compromiser, and the displeasure of the real compromisers by having no substantial compromise to offer. What he had in his mind, as subsequently revealed by Nicolay and Hay's account of his memorandum of April 1st, was a plan of pulling the seceders
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