INTRODUCTION.
THE study of federalism as a system of government has, in recent times, become a favorite subject for constitutional writers. At present the United States and the Dominion of Canada on this continent, the newly constituted Australian Commonwealth at the Antipodes, and in Europe the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Swiss Confederation are all examples of the application of the federal principle in its various phases. What makes all researches into this branch of political learning particularly difficult, and, perhaps, for that reason, also exceptionally fascinating, is the fact that federated states seem forever oscillating between the two extremes of complete centralization and decentralization. The two forces, centripetal and centrifugal, seem to be always pulling against each other, and producing a new resultant which varies according to their proportionate intensity. One is almost tempted to say that there must be an ideal state somewhere between these two extremes, some point of perfect balance, from which no nation can ever depart very far, without either falling apart into anarchy or being consolidated into despotism. Whatever, therefore, can throw a light upon these obscure forces is certainly entitled to our deepest interest.
But not all representatives of federalism possess an equal value for us, in our search after improvements in the art of self-government. The study of the constitutions of the German and AustroHungarian Empires can only be of secondary importance to us Americans, because these states are founded upon monarchical principles, quite foreign to our body politic. To a limited extent, the same objection may be made to the Canadian and Australian constitutions, since the connection of those countries with the monarchical mother-country has not been constitutionally severed. But there is
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