believed it to be antagonistic to both these conditions. They believed that whilst no civilised country can allow any of its citizens to perish for the want of the necessaries of life, whilst in other words food, shelter, clothing, and warmth must be provided for every destitute person who applies for it, yet that the position of those in receipt of public relief should be "less eligible" than that of the independent labourer. The words "less eligible" do not mean that it is to be harsh or inhuman; on the contrary, the maintenance provided is to be good and sufficient, but it must not attract those to it who can by any means support themselves without it. They did not consider, moreover, that legal relief was to be a substitute for the obligations of personal charity, and, in the development of their idea, charitable action has been assigned a definite place.
The outward expression of this doctrine has always been understood to be the offer of institutional relief by the State. Of course it has been widely departed from in many cases, and we may admit at once that it would be harsh to apply it suddenly and rigidly in any district where the contrary practice has long prevailed, unless at the same time some steps are taken to deal with the "hard cases" by voluntary action. The utmost that even those who believe in it can wish is that it should be gradually and humanely applied. This much, however, is certain, judging at least from all the experience that we have ready to hand, that the more widely we depart from this principle the greater become the difficulties of State relief, the more numerous and more miserable the poor.
The leading feature of State relief as compared with charitable relief is that it is compulsorily levied. Next to this come its centralisation, its indefinite ownership, its indefinite limits. Owing to its
