lination by the District Attorney to comply with an order of the Court directing him to take further steps, and after a refusal of the Grand Jury to indict in September, the matter was dropped. This episode confirmed Jefferson and his party in their view that the Federal Judges were determined to maintain all the old obnoxious features of the Federalist policies. As the detested Sedition Act was no longer in existence, the proceeding for libel in this case had been instituted under the common law. Since it was highly doubtful whether the article constituted criminal libel even at common law, Jefferson considered the action of the Court to be a pure usurpation. And another prominent Virginian wrote : "It would seem that the 'friends of order’ being beaten out of Executive and Legislative forts, are about to man their cannon en barbette and play upon all the Republicans from the Gibraltar of the Judiciary Department. ... It seems an absurdity that the Courts of the United States should have any check or control, in the least degree, over the press or the opinions of citizens or others respecting the President, Congress, Judiciary, the Constitution, or, in short, respecting any subject whatever. From the nature of the Government of the United States, it cannot stand in need of any restriction of the freedom of the press, and as, on the one hand, it cannot stand in need of these powers claimed by the Judiciary, so, on the other, they cannot be entrusted with them and be enabled thereby to extend these powers and gratify the wishes of the Legislative and Executive to whom they may look up for the rewards of their obsequiousness."[1] The Republican newspapers treated the affair as an example of Federalist partisanship, and one asked : "Can any candid men have any further doubts
- ↑ National Intelligencer, Nov. 18, 1801.
