decided 9 then unquestionably it became the duty of
the Court to pass upon its constitutionality. Mar-
shall naturally felt that in view of the recent attacks
on judicial power it was important to have the great
principle firmly established, and undoubtedly he wel-
comed the opportunity of fixing the precedent in a
case in which his action would necessitate a decision
in favor of his political opponents. Accordingly, after
reviewing the provisions of the Constitution as to the
original jurisdiction of the Court, he held that there
was no authority in Congress to add to that original
jurisdiction, that the statute was consequently invalid,
and that it was the duty of the Court so to declare.
In comprehensive and forceful terms, which for over
one hundred years have never been successfully con-
troverted, he proceeded to lay down the great prin-
ciples of the supremacy of the Constitution over
statute law, and of the duty and power of the Judiciary
to act as the arbiter in case of any conflict between
the two. "This principle," as has been well said,
"is wholly and exclusively American. It is America's
original contribution to the science of law. The
assertion of it, under the conditions . . . was the deed
of a great man." ^
Had Marshall's opinion in this case been confined exclusively to a determination of the validity of the
^ Marshall, Ul, 142. William Trickett in Marhury v. Maduon, Criiique, Amer. Law R89, (1910)» IHI, says that it gave Marshall "an opportunity to administer a lecture" to Jefferson. Edward S. Corwin in The Doctrine qf Judicial Review (1014), 0, and Mich. Law Ree, (lOll, 1014), X, XII, says: "Regarded as a judicial decision, the decision of Marbury v. Madieon must be considered as most extraordinary, but regarded as a political pamphlet designed to irritate an enemy to the very limit of endurance, it must be considered a huge success." And again he says : "To speak quite frankly, this decision bears many of the earmarks of a deliberate partisan coup. The Court was bent on reading the President a lecture on his legal and moral duty to recent Federalist appointees to judicial office . . .but at the same time hesitated to invite a snub, by actually asserting jurisdiction ol the matter." Nothing in Marshall's character, however, justifies such imputation of low-minded and unjudicial motives, and the criticism seems too severe.
