and they require a fair rather than hypercritical view
of well-intended provisions in them. Those public
bodies must be presumed to act from pubhc considera-
tions, being in a high pubUc trust; and when their
measures relate to matters of general interest, and
can be vindicated under express or justly implied
powers, and more especially when they appear intended
for improvements, made in the true spirit of the age,
or for salutary reforms in abuses, the dispK>sition in
the Judiciary should be strong to uphold them.*' It
was not until the year 1871 that this rule was applied
in a case involving an Act of Congress, when in the
Legal Tender Cases j Judge Strong stated that "a de-
cent respect for a coordinate branch of the Govern-
ment demands that the Judiciary should presume,
until the contrary is clearly shown, that there has
been no transgression of i>ower by Congress — all the
members of which act under the obligation of an oath
of fidelity to the Constitution. Such has always been
the rule." In 1878, Chief Justice Waite stated that
- the safety of our institutions depends in no small
degree on a strict observance of this salutary rule."^
Finally, the Court's retention of popular support has been strengthened by the scrupulous care with which it has refrained from assuming any authority to decide the policy or impolicy of legislation. "No instance is afforded from the foundation of the government," said Judge White in 1904, "where an act which was within a power conferred, was declared to be repugnant to the Constitution, because it appeared to the judicial mind that the particular exertion of constitutional power was either unwise or unjust. To announce such a principle would amount to declaring that, in our constitutional system, the Judiciary was not only charged with the duty of upholding the Constitution, but also
