ent parts of the country. As was conclusively said
fifty years ago, when the most serious efforts were made
thus to weaken the Court : "If the Judges of the Union
are silenced, those of the States will be left entirely
uncontrolled. Remove the supervisory functions of
the National Judiciary, and these laws will become the
sport of local partisanship; upheld in one common-
wealth, they will be overthrown in another and all
compulsive character will be lost. ... To restrict
their jurisdiction and weaken their moral power is,
therefore, to sacrifice in a most unnecessary manner
that department of the Government which more than
any other will make National ideas triumphant, not
only in the legislation of today but in the permanent
convictions of the people."[1] As to the proposition,
formerly much advocated, to abolish the Coiu't en-
tirely and to place final power of judicial decision in
the United States Senate, no trace of support can now be found.
To the proposal, advanced at various times of intense party passion, that the Court should be increased in number in order to overcome a temporary majority for or against some particular piece of legislation, the good sense of the American people has always given a decided disapproval; even mere partisan politicians see clearly that the employment of such an expedient is a weapon which may be equally used against them by their political opponents and may therefore prove disastrous in the long run ; and James Bryce has eloquently set forth the true foundation of the Court's security against such an effort to turn the course of justice: "What prevents such assaults on the fundamental law — assaults which, however immoral in substance, would be perfectly legal in form? Not the mechan-
- ↑ Nation, Feb. 20. 1868.
