something else than those included, his theory would be absolutely refuted.
Fortunately for Marx, however, and unfortunately for Böhm-Bawerk, Marx did thoroughly investigate these very "goods," "which possess exchange-value although they are not the product of labor," under which cloudy description is meant the soil and other "natural" objects which are the subjects of bargain and sale. Not only is Marx's investigation of this particular branch of the subject thorough (it occupies about 200 pages of his book), but his theoretical explanation thereof is so convincing, that none of his critics, not even Böhm-Bawerk, have ever as much as attempted to refute it. We think, therefore, that we are very charitable to Böhm-Bawerk when we assume that he really did not mean to say that Marx excluded these particular "goods" from his investigation, but merely from his analysis; and that he simply fell a victim to the deplorable lack of precision which seems inseparable from all Marx-criticism.
We must add, however, that we dwelt at such length on this point not merely because we were anxious to "show up" the carelessness of terminology and lack of precision of thought, in even the greatest of Marx-critics, important as this may be, but because the subject-matter involved in this objection is of great importance in the opinion of all Marx-critics, as well as our own. It really amounts to this:—that the labor-theory of value does not take "nature" into account or consideration; "it denies the participation of nature in the production of goods." Now, this, if true, is a very serious charge. The denial of the participation of nature in the production of "goods," or anything, for that matter, is so manifestly absurd that it will vitiate any argument, analysis, or other logical operation, into which it enters. Could Marx have been guilty of anything like that? Countless expressions of Marx show that he was not ignorant of the participation of nature in the production of "goods," if proof is necessary that Marx knew of the exist-
