scope of the present work. Besides, we fully agree with one Marx-critic, Oppenheimer, who, evidently disgusted with the poor showing Bernstein made with his statistics, declares that those who attempt to refute Marx by statistics are on the wrong track. For, says he, you can only beat Marx by his own method, and the Marxian method is not at all statistical. Marx never relies on statistics to prove his assertions. He uses statistics only for the purposes of illustration. His proofs he gets from well-known facts which may be recorded in the statistical tomes but do not need any statistics to establish them. We will say here only this: Since the disastrous attempt of Bernstein to use statistics against the Marxian position, this weapon has been almost entirely discarded by Revisionists. On the other hand it must be admitted that Marxists also resort to statistics now with less confidence than formerly. It seems that since the publication of their books in which the same statistics are used by Bernstein on the one hand and Kautsky on the other and such different conclusions arrived at by each, people have become distrustful of statistics. Oppenheimer voices this general distrust when he says: "Statistics are an extremely pliable mass, as the literary controversy between Bernstein and Kautsky has shown. With a little dialectical dexterity you can prove almost anything statistically."
We disagree with the learned Marx-critic that you can prove anything and everything by statistics. But we do believe that you can prove nothing by statistics unless you handle them intelligently. Of themselves statistics do not prove anything. No more than facts of themselves prove anything. If it were so there could hardly be two opinions on most points which have been in controversy ever since scientific research began. It requires intellect to read the facts. It requires intelligence to read statistics. Furthermore, it requires great intelligence to gather statistics, and in this respect statistics, which are mere records of facts, are a poorer basis for scientific generalizations than facts of
