justification for the wide-spread opinion that Marxists deny to the individual any influence on the course of History. Not, of course, in anything contained in the writings of Marx or his immediate disciples, but in some loose talk and inaccurate expressions of some alleged Marxists. He says:
"While some subjectivists, in their efforts to magnify the role of the 'individual' in history, refused to acknowledge any historical laws in the process of the social development of humanity, some of their newest opponents, in their efforts to accentuate the evolutionary process of this development, evidently forgot that History is made by men, and that therefore the activities of the individuals must necessarily influence it. They considered the individual quantité négligeable. Theoretically, however, such a view is no more permissible than that of the extreme subjectivists."
And then, after going into a detailed examination of this question and analyzing some historical examples which bear upon the subject, he comes to the following conclusion:
"It follows, that some individuals, owing to the peculiarities of their character, may influence the historical course of events. Sometimes this influence is quite considerable. But the possibility of such influence, as well as its magnitude, are limited by the organization of society, by the relation of its forces. The character of the individual appears as a factor of social development only in such places, at such times, and to such an extent, where, when, and to the extent that, the social relations permit it.
"It will probably be suggested that the extent of the influence which an individual may exert on the course of history depends also on the abilities of the individual. To this we may readily accede. But the individual can display his abilities only after he shall have assumed the necessary position in the social organization. . . . It is this organization, therefore, which limits, at any given time, the role—and consequently the social influence—which may fall to the lot of gifted or mediocre individuals."
The raising of the individual to the dignity of a historical factor raises the question of the influence of chance or accident in history, which is intimately connected with it. And he proceeds to elucidate it, thus:
"Hegel says that in all things finite there is an element of chance. In science we have to do with the 'finite' only; it may therefore be properly said that in all the processes which she makes the objects of her study there is an element of the acci-
