The first of the objections to the Materialistic Conception of History advanced by the Marx-critics which we will consider here is the so-called "philosophic" objection. We will consider it first because of its great pretensions and because of its old age, it being in reality merely a new edition of the old idealistic philosophy with which Marx had to deal as far back as 1845. In its pure, idealistic form Marx squared his accounts with it in his own masterly fashion in his book "Die Heilige Familie." The account was settled, the balance was struck, and no more was heard of idealism. It now re-appears bashfully under cover of a scientific theory of cognition and psychology. No matter what its garb, however, it is essentially the same, except that with the loss of its purity it has lost its logic. Pure idealism, as represented by Hegel, for instance, is logically a perfectly constructed edifice. It rests on false foundations. But its premises admitted, its logical construction is impregnable. Not so with modern "philosophy." It is idealistic without the logic of the finished idealistic structure. What is worse, however, it is reactionary, which is not necessarily an attribute of idealism. Desiring to avoid the logical consequences of the development of philosophy, in which the idealistic system of Hegel must inevitably be followed by the materialism of Marx, its watchword is: "Go back." And the further back the better. . . . So that we find Weisengruen, a leading light among these philosophers, throwing loving glances at Berkeley, who was perhaps as much of an idealist as Hegel himself, but
