invaluable aid in arriving at a true answer to the question before us, and it is the hope of the present writer that he will at some future day be able to do this work, so that the relative position of the Marxian theory may be fully appreciated. In this present discussion, however, we will have to be guided by, so to speak, absolute standards rather than relative ones, and other theories of value will only be gone into in so far as is absolutely necessary to the discussion of the main criticism levelled against the Marxian theory. This particularly applies to the so-called "modern" theory of value familiarly known as the Austrian, although by origin and popularity England has as much claim upon it as Austria. This "honorable mention" of the Austrian theory of value is due not so much to its own originality or importance, as to the fact that it seems to be the prevailing one among the latter-day Marx critics, Böhm-Bawerk himself taking the lead in the particular field of inquiry now under discussion.
While, as we have already stated in the introductory chapter, each tub of anti-Marxian criticism lays claim to and is entitled to stand upon its own bottom, in the discussion of the Marxian theory of value and surplus value, we will, to a great extent, have to limit ourselves to the arguments advanced by Böhm-Bawerk. The reason for it is two-fold: first, because Böhm-Bawerk is so far superior to his comrades in arms, and his authority on the subject is acknowledged by them to such an extent, that it can hardly be claimed to be unfair to these critics, to pick Böhm-Bawerk as an example of them all. Second, because there seems to be quite a good deal of unanimity among these critics on this particular point, and the arguments advanced by the others are either directly borrowed from Böhm-Bawerk, very often, with an acknowledgment of receipt, or are variations on the same tune deserving no particular attention. Where the variation is sufficiently distinct to make a difference, it will be duly noted, as will,
