between a republic and one of the best of monarchies, tended
to hasten recognition of the new order in Brazil. Another
consideration which urged this policy was a desire to secure
and retain the friendship and the markets of the largest
and most populous Hispanic American state. Consequently,
as soon as news of the revolution reached Washington the
minister of the United States in Brazil was instructed to
maintain diplomatic relations with the provisional gov-
ernment. Moreover, a few days later he was directed to
give the republic “a cordial and formal recognition” as soon
as the majority of the people of Brazil signified their ac-
ceptance of the new regime.[1]
The proposed delay in formal recognition was deemed by
the administration a wise precaution in view of the fact
that such a step, if taken before the real nature of the
revolt had become manifest, might succeed only in strength-
ening a military despotism whereas its true design would
be to advance the cause of popular government in the New
World. Yet President Harrison’s announcement of his
policy to Congress occasioned a somewhat vigorous attempt
on the part of aggressive members of the democratic party
to force the executive to move more rapidly. They argued
that immediate recognition would strengthen the hands of
the republicans of Brazil and do much toward discouraging
any designs of interference which might be entertained in
Europe. The friends of the administration in Congress
were able to delay precipitate action, however.[2]
With reference to this policy public opinion was divided,
but apparently the majority was in accord with the admin-
istration; and although decided partisan coloring may be
detected in the press, both parties made it clear that they
had the true interests of the Brazilian people at heart. A
few quotations will set forth the various motives and cross
currents which were operating at the time.
—7—
